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MODERN TRENDS IN THE JUDICIAL CONCEPT OF THE
RELATION BETWEEN CITIZENSHIP AND THE SUFFRAGE
By WILLIAM DAVID STOUT*
I
Ex nihilo nihil fit.
-Roman proverb
The civil rights issue is being discussed as widely as any other
in our national political scene; and like most others that arise from
time to time, it is considered almost universally in the light of popular
prejudices and historical misinterpretations. In the press, on the
street, in Congress, and even in academic circles, we hear discussions
of pending civil rights legislation based on such concepts as
Herrenvolk and the "rights" of a vague Hegelian entity called a "state"
The shadowy figure of a little Austrian ghost seems to smile approv-
ingly upon many of our concepts that involve such mysticisms as
white supremacy and states with personalities. In view of the present
interest in and controversy over civil rights, it seems that the time has
come to re-examine some of our traditional concepts and accepted
dogmas. There is a need, at the present time, to arrive at a generally
accepted definition of such terms as civil liberties, civil rights, political
privileges, and citizenship, and to attempt the establishment of a re-
lationship between them if possible. As a beginning in establishing
any such relationship that may exist, this article is offered.
The pages that follow make no attempt to define exactly the
before-mentioned terms, but, as indicated in the title, limit themselves
to a discussion of the concept of citizenship and its meaning in a free
society It is believed by this writer that if an understanding of this
word and an agreement as to the rights inherent in the condition it
describes is reached, most problems arising from civil rights and civil
liberties will be resolved automatically It is with this premise that
the historical meaning of the term, as well as what it has come to
mean in the minds of American judges, will be discussed. Despite
relatively firm pronouncements in the past by students and courts to
* A.B., Georgetown College; M.A. University of Kentucky. Department of Po-
litical Science, University of Tennessee. Formerly taught at the University of Ken-
tucky and Connecticut College.
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the effect that the suffrage is not a necessary attribute of citizenship,
there has been a recent tendency to include it m discussions of civil
rights. This tendency is in direct opposition to the view generally
expressed in American jurisprudence, especially since the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
The adoption of that Amendment marks the beginning of the
movement in this country to draw a clear line of distinction between
civil liberties and civil rights, on the one hand, and political privileges
on the other. This distinction was an old one, at that time, on the
European continent but had never been rigidly observed in the less
doctrinaire outlook of English Common Law At the risk of making
a generalized statement of questionable accuracy, civil liberties and
civil rights, for our limited purposes here, may be lumped together
and defined collectively as liberties and immunities that are inherent
in citizenship. These are considered generally to include the im-
munity of a person against arbitrary bodily restraint and judicial
procedure, the right of free expression, and those rights defined in the
first nine amendments. Some students consider all of these to be civil
liberties that have their sanction in a body of natural law, while posi-
tive laws that establish the conditions necessary to the enjoyment of
these liberties are held to be the civil rights in the strictest sense.
From the foregoing, it is accepted usually that the rights and immuni-
ties of citizens do not include the suffrage.
The very fact, however, that the recent report of the President's
Commission on Civil Rights, as well as the civil rights planks in both
major party platforms last year, included the subject of the suffrage,
indicates an undercurrent of thought that considers the suffrage as
essential to citizenship.i It will be the purpose of the remainder of
this discussion to examine some of the concepts of citizenship accepted
at various periods in history and to determine whether or not this
undercurrent of thought is nullius filius trying to work its way into
the society of respectable legal concepts that boast a noble heritage
of sound precedent.
At the moment, no attempt will be made to reach a definition of
citizenship that can be accepted as final. Instead, it is hoped that this
writer's interpretation of several periods of history will make his posi-
hon clear and will, at least, shed some light on the origins of the
term. First, it should be noted that the terms citizen and citizenshtp
have rarely been used except in those political societies dedicated to
I President's Commission on Civil -Rights, To Secure These Rights, Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1947.
Platform of the Republican Party, New York Times, June 22, 1948, p. 2, col. 2.
llatform of the Democratic Party, ibid., July 5, 1948, p. 8, Col. 1-6.
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the principle of individual dignity and the existence of certain funda-
mental liberties that give immunity against arbitrary action. Citizen,
or its equivalent, is common in the writings of ancient Greece and
Rome, but it fell into disuse during the latter period of the Roman
Empire and in the writings of Medieval Europe. Here it was sup-
planted by such terms as subject, man, vassal, or liegeman. As shall
be pointed out later, the word is sometimes used in ancient writings
to describe a person who has certain rights but who takes no part in
determining the policies or leadership of the state. This use, however,
is always qualified, and full citizenship before modem times was al-
ways used to denote active membership and participation in a political
society
H
Qtus nam gitur liber? Sapiens qut sibi ,mperiosus.
I -Horace
It is impossible here to do any more than mention very briefly
the concept of citizenship in ancient Greece, although Athens is con-
ceded generally to have been the forerunner of later free governments.
A quick perusal of the ideas of one man will have to be considered
sufficient to give us a fair view of an idea that was doubtless accepted
by enough Athenians to be recognized as a valid Athenian view It is
said by Aristotle," who has as good a claim as any other man to be
the first systematic political scientist, that a citizen is one who shares
in the political administration of the state. No person who does not
share in this activity can be considered a citizen in the fullest sense
of the word. Nor can judicial privileges or immunities be considered
a test of citizenship, for, as Aristotle says, these may even be given to
foreigners by treaty Aristotle speaks of the active officeholder as a
dicast and a member of the sovereign political assembly as an eccle-
siast. In attempting to find a common term including both, he says-
"Let us for the sake of distinction call it 'indefinite office,'
and we will assume that those who share in such office are citizens.
This is the most comprehensive definition of a citizen, and best suits
all those who are generally so called
"He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or
judicial administration of any state is said to be a citizen of that state;
and speaking generally, a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the
purposes of life."'
Thus Aristotle reaches the conclusion that the citizens of a state
"I'Oiiics. III, 1 1275a, 4 ft. (Jowett's translation).
"Ibid.. 1275a, 311-34; 1275b, 19-21.
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are by definition those who hold the sovereign power. In a democracy
we must assume, then, if we accept the Aristotelian view, that this
sovereign body is the group referred to in such characteristic phrases
as "we the people." If the ideas expressed in the Politics are to be
considered even a partial basis for modern political thinking, we can
quite easily and logically conclude that the "people" referred to in
American constitutions are those who hold the political sovereignty
Of course, this concept of citizenship is entirely too simple to satisfy
the doctrinaire approach of modern legal thought, and we have found
it necessary to draw a fine line of distinction between civil liberties
and civil rights on the one hand and political privileges on the other.
If our legal concepts were simplified so, it well might be that legisla-
tive bodies themselves would understand what they had ordained as
well as the courts! Liberty m this country has come to mean the pos-
session of certain fundamental rights, more specifically, those rights
mentioned by Justice McReynolds in Myer v Nebraska. According
to this statement, liberty includes-
not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the com-
mon occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience, and, generally, to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. The established doctrine is
that this liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of pro-
tecting the public interest "
In addition to these liberties, a citizen is guaranteed certain im-
munities in court procedure that may be denied to a non-citizen or
a national. " The possession of these procedural rights has become our
most valid test of citizenship. Compare this to the clinching state-
ment in Aristotle's argument that-
as is evident, there arc different kinds of citi-
zens [but] he is a citizen in the highest sense who shares in
the honors of the state."'
Lest it be said that Aristotle's view was too philosophical and was
not founded upon a firm legal basis, it should be noted that in Rome
this same viewpoint was held generally No lesser figure than Cicero
says that no monarchy or oligarchy, regardless of the idealism char-
acterstic of the rulers, can be a good government. This is because
4 362 U. S. 390 67 L. Ed. 1042; 43 S. Ct., 625 (1923).
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S., 197" 47 L. Ed. 1016; 28 S. Ct., 787 (1903); Dorr
v. United States, 195 U.S. 138; 49 L. Ed. 128, 24 S. Ct. 808 (1904); Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 66 L. Ed. 627, 42 S. Ct. 343 (1922).
Op. cit., III, 5; 1278a, 35-38.
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all men are equal-a serious departure from Aristotle-and, in order
to enjoy that equality, must be given a share in the rulersip of the
state. Even the most enlightened form of authoritarianism possesses
something of the nature of slavery, and true liberty could never exist
under the conditions established by such governments. 7 Now the
question arises as to whether Cicero represents an isolated case or
whether his view was accepted and his ideas applied. That the sov-
ereignty in the early Roman Republic, at least theoretically, rested m
the general body of citizens, or the Populus, there can be no doubt.
Though possibly inaccurate in some details and often over idyllic,
the description of the Roman Constitution by Polybius is sufficient
to demonstrate this point." Does it necessarily follow, however, that
membership in the sovereign Populus was essential to or constituted
the test of citizenship? This question can be answered only by a dis-
cussion of the expansion of Rome before the time of Augustus and
by noting the measures taken with respect to the non-Roman peoples
who were brought under her rule.
As Rome exerted pressure against her boundaries and expanded
over the Italian peninsula, many peoples who felt no bond with the
heritage of the ancient city found themselves incorporated into the
growing political system. This created a tremendous problem for the
new governors, for holding so manv people in subjugation was too
great a task for so small a population. The only answer was to extend
to the conquered peoples certain benefits and privileges m order to
insure their allegiance. To do tis, these peoples had to be given a
sense of belonging to or membership in the body politic; but to extend
the suffrage to so many over such a large territory would mean a
surrender of sovereignty by the conqueror to the conquered. Also
ancient voting procedures and tallying methods could not cope with
an expression of public opinion with such a broad base. The prece-
dent for the solution of this problem was set when Rome expanded to
include the coast peoples south of Latium and the lower Volturnas
Valley Livy tells us that at this time the peoples of Fundi, Formiae,
Capua, Cumae, and Suessula were given the Roman citizenship
sime .suffragio.9 In other words, citizenship had become a condition
in which legal, property, and civil rights were protected but political
privileges were not guaranteed. It should be noted carefully, though,
that Livy refers to this as a special kind of or qualified citizenship, the
implication being that full citizenship still denoted membership in the
sovereign Populus. In the year 189 B. C. a bill had granted full citi-
Di. R PtIBLICA, T. 26-27.
" HIsroRirs, VI, 11-18.
"All URBU CoNDrrA, VIII, I I.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
zenship, or the right to enroll in the rural tribes, to sons of ex-slaves.
That this grant carried with it the suffrage is substantiated by the fact
that Sempronmus modified it in 167 B. C. because of the tendency of
these libertint to vote in blocks. The recall of the suffrage, then, was
in itself a modification of citizenship. 10
The policy of giving qualified or sine suffragio citizenship to non-
Roman peoples on the pemnsula, and, later, in other parts of the
world, continued with the expansion of this energetic city-state's
power over the Mediterranean area. In the year 125 B. C., during
the consulship of M. Fulvius Flaccus, further recognition of the prob-
lem growing out of the absorbtion of non-Roman peoples into the
growing empire was given by the adoption of a measure which was
to become the accepted policy in later times. Those of the peoples
allied with Rome who were willing to accept Roman citizenship were
enfranchised. Those who did not elect to come into the Roman state
were given the right to appeal to the Populus against acts of tyranny
by Roman magistrates." With some modifications this became ac-
cepted policy in the following years, and we see in it the formal
establishment of two grades of citizenship: that which gave to those
who held it a share in the choice of officials and in the making of
policy, and that which carried a guarantee of justice to its holders.
The Populus then was not only the ultimate seat of authority and
protector of the rights of the member cives, its authority extended to
protect the rights of those coming under the tus provocations.
During the period of Rome's expansion beyond the Italian penin-
sular, the term civitas sine suffragio was gradually dropped in favor of
the term Latin rights. The reason for this lay deeper than in an
accidental change in terminology but was based on the fact that in
the latter days of the Republic full citizenship had ceased to exist for
all pr.ctical purposes. In the hectic years of the first century B. C.,
events all seemed to point toward the time when the Populus as a
sovereign body was to become a myth or, at best, only an ideal. The
real power was shifting into the hands of a small military and aristo-
cratic oligarchy Personal rivalries within this class of "war Lords"'
dominated political affairs from the bloody epoch of Marius and
Sulla until peace and order were finally restored under Augustus.
During this period of civil strife and chaos, one series of events
tend to demonstrate the shift of power from the Populus to the small
group of political manipulators at the top. As late as the year 49 B. C.
the Praetor L. Roscius had proposed and secured the passage of a
Livy, op. cit., XLV, 15.
" From THE CAMBRIDGE ANCIENT HISToRY, London, Vol. IX, 1932, p. 46.
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bill granting full citizensip and the franchise to the people of Cisal-
pine Gaul, thus completing the enfranchisement of all Italy In the
same year Caesar, seeking to consolidate political support, rewarded
the Transpadine Gauls for past services by a Lex Rubia effectmg a
transition of these people from Latin rights to full citizenship as far
as legal procedure was concerned. "' Thus citizenship may exist with-
out the suffrage; but this citizenship did not represent an elevation of
the Latins, it merely demonstrated the loss by citizens generally of
that right which distinguished them from Latins. The emotional
feeling of superiority, a feeling of aristocratic distinction, was now the
distingumshng mark of the Roman citizen.
The principle of the sovereign power resting in the Populus,
however, never completely disappeared in theory; in fact, it remained
a basic cornerstone of western political philosophy throughout the
Middle Ages. Oddly enough, it was even used as a support for the
despotism of the Roman Emperors. We are told by Cassius Dio that
in 24 B. C. a decree, later referred to as the Lex Regia or Lex Imperio,
was passed by the Roman Senate.1 The origms of this act are not
clear to modern historians; there even seems to be some doubt as to
the accuracy of the preceding account, but of one thing we are certain:
the principles laid down in the act were recognized by the lawyers
of the Empire and of the Middle Ages. The law was simply that the
Roman people, acting in their sovereign capacity, delegated their
power to the Princeps! No more complete transfer of political author-
ity has ever been made, nor could it be. Such an unlimited delegation
could never serve as a restraint upon imperial authority but did serve
to preserve the theory of popular sovereignty The extent to which
this delegation was arried is illustrated by Ulpian's statement that
"princeps legibus solutus est."14
A closer examination of this statement of imperial authority would
indicate that the Roman Populus was no longer a body of individual
men, but rather an organism in itself. Blanket consent had been given
for the Emperor to exercise sovereign powers, but the consent had
been granted unanimously by a group acting collectively; minorities
were a part of this group but were considered also to have given
their consent. The fact that tis theoretical consent was given gave
rise to the important maxim in Roman law that nothing is so peculiarly
characteristic of imperial power as the fact that the Emperor must
live and rule under the lawsY1 This doctrine apparently represented
,,Ibid., p. 644.
" LIII 28, 2.
uDiGEsr, 1,3, 31.
15JUSTINIAN, CODEX, VI, 23, 3.
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the generally accepted view, but, of course, m actual practice, it seems
inevitable that Ulpian's more realistic statement should hold true.
With the passing of any effective political control from the body
of citizenry, there was no method of protecting any of the rights or
privileges held by this group. By the fourth century, political citizen-
ship had ceased to exist and with it passed many, if not most, of the
legal immunities. True, some persons such as manumitted slaves
were restricted in their right to pass property on to their children and
by other legal disabilihes; these persons were called Latms to distin-
guish them from citizens. However, not all of those who were recog-
nized as citizens were granted full legal immunities, for stringent legal
restrictions maintained a rigid caste system that was the antithesis of
judicial protection. A citizen was no more than a member of a
social stratum.
As man's position in the state became more and more dependent
upon his station in life, he lost status as an individual and became
simply a component part of a group which had an organic life of its
own. Any consent by which an emperor ruled was a perfunctory
recognition by this social organism of a fait accompli and, in actual
practice, did not involve the active consent or refusal of consent by
individuals after effective deliberation. Politically, man had been
submerged or lost in the background. However, it should be pointed
out again, at the risk of monotonous over-repetition, that the theories
of the times allowed for no inherent imperial authority Despite a
few isolated statements by such men as St. Gregory and St. Isadore
that suggest a divine sanction for imperial authority, the rule accepted
by most was still the doctrine of Ulpian:
Quod prnctpi placuit, legzs habet vigorem ut pote
cum lege rega, quae de impeno elus lata est, populus et et in eum
omne suum tmperzum et potestatum conferat."'
In retrospect it seems safe at this point to draw the conclusion
that the rise and fall of political privilege as a right of citizenship was
concurrent with the rise and fall of those legal rights and immunities
by which modem students seek to characterize citizenship. No re-
sponsible historian would be likely to venture the assertion that real
universal suffrage ever existed in the ancient world, but at least it can
be said that shortcomings in this field were not rationalized by legal
justifications. As long as true political citizenship existed, even if only
in theory, legal immunities were protected. These immunities were
lost when the individual was conquered by a living, organic society
" DIG., 1, 4, 1.
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III
Le feu qui semble etemt souvent dort sous la cendre;
Qui l'ose reveiller petit s'en laisser sur prendre.
-Corneille.
With the passing of the Roman Empire and its theoretical re-
incarnation in the Medieval German Empire, we find that the doctrine
of popular consent lived on as the foundation of the political thought
of the Middle Ages. True, the concept of citizenship and the rights
inherent in it seemed lost, for social activity was a group activity
completely submerging man or the individual. Man had his station
in society, but society could speak for all men. Of course the result
was somewhat the same as in the later Roman Empire, this is, the
Emperor or king was an absolute ruler, but sometimes more than mere
lip service was paid to the idea of popular consent. We see at an early
date a significant example of this in connection with the dethronement
and later restoration of the Emperor Lewis. One of the leading
scholars of the day, Hincmar of Rheims, has the following comment
on that situation:
Nostra aetate pum Augustum Ludovzcum a regno de-
lectre, post satisfactionem episcopalis unantinitas, samore consilio,
cume populi coizse nlst, et Ecclestae et regno restituit.'
Medieval sources are full of such illusions to an organic state
delegating its powers to a king or emperor, although no formal repre-
sentative body existed. As another example, we have the following
excerpt from the proclamation of the Truce of God for the Diocese
of Cologne in 1083. After expressing the need for such a measure,
the proclamation continues:
And by the advice of our faithful subjects we have at
length provided this remedy, so that we might to some extent re-
establish, on certain days at least, the peace which, because of our
sins, we could not make enduring. Accordingly we have enacted and
set forth the followmng: having called together our parishioners to a
legally summoned council, which was held at Cologne we have
caused to be remd in public what we propose to do in this matter.
After this had been for some time fully discussed "pro and con" by
all, it was unamnmously agreed upon, both the clergy and the people
consenting, and we declared in what manner and during what parts
of the year it ought to be observed."
That this idea of government by popular consent was to a great
Di, Di% oRTio HLOTARII ET THELBERGAE, VI.
rRANSLATIONS AND REPRIN IS FROM THF ORIG.NAL SOURCES O:- EUROPEAN HISTORY,
Rev. Ed.. Philadelphia, Vol. I, 1902, 2, p. 9-10.
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extent Roman rather than Teutonic is indicated by a comparison of
the coronation oaths of various English kings during the period of
transition from the Saxon to the Norman periods. In 978 the new
Saxon king Ethelred II, in a condescending manner, made certain
promises to his people, however, without recognizing them as the
ultimate source of hIs authority We note some, although little,
change in this expressed by the first Norman in 1066 when William
the Conqueror began his oath with the following phrase:
Having first, as the archbishop required, sworn before the
altar of St. Peter the Apostle, m the presence of the clergy and the
people
This suggestion of the recognition of the consent principle was
fully amplified by Henry I, who upon taking the throne in 1101, an-
nounced to the people of England:
Know that by the mercy of God, and by the common
counsel of the barons of the whole kingdom of England, I have been
crowned king of the same kingdom."
At no time in Medieval history before the Reformation was any
theory of governmental authority other than that of consent generally
adopted. However, care should be taken not to confuse this concept
with those from which modern representative government stems, for
in the Middle Ages consent was given not by a majority of individuals
but rather by a living organism known as society Majorities today
may often determine the wishes of individuals in a group, but Medieval
society was considered to have a life of its own, separate from that
of individuals. Care should be taken, reasoned the learned men of
the period, lest men should make their own laws. Magisterial author-
ity was considered to be representative of the group, but not of
majorities of individuals or single men. This organismic concept is
probably best illustrated by the following quotation from Bulgarus,
one of the famous "four doctors" who followed Irnerius at the Bologna
law school:
"Non est stngulis concendum, quod per magistratum pub-
lice possit fien, ne occaszo sit malons tumultus factendi." Vigor
;udicianus ideo est medio constitutus ne snguli jus sibz dicant. Non
enim competit szngulis, quod per nrsum est tantum unwersitati, vel
et qui obtenit vicem unwersitatis, id est populi, qualis est magiStratus:
aliogutn-contingeret occasto maalons tumultus.2'
Public policy, then, was determined by the customs of the people
collectively and not by groups of persons constituting a majority
Even ths might be considered changed by the application of the Lex
"The full texts of these three oaths are found in ibid., I, 6, p. 2-3.
" BULGARUS. GLOSS ON DIGEST, L, 177, 176.
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Regia, under which it became doubtful as to whether or not the
Populus could ever retrieve the sovereignty once it was delegated to
the Emperor. The Emperor was m a position actually to announce
the will of the nation. Not only must we recognize that it was in
practice impossible for the Populus to regain powers delegated to the
Emperor, at an early date we have a formalized statement of such a
step even in theory In commenting on the saying of Julianus to the
effect that custom has the force of law, Irnerlus says that this was
once true, but not after the Lex Regia. The full statement reads:
Loquitus haec lex secundum sua tempora, quibus populus
habebat potestatum condendi legas, ideo tacito concensu omntum per
consuetudenem abrogabantus. Sed quta hodie potestas translata est
in tmpenum, nihil faceret desuetudo populi.'
Thus in an age of authoritarian government, we find that most
political thinkers were writing in terms of government by consent.
True, these theories of popular consent often did take a turn like that
of the above quotation, but, nevertheless, the idea remained constant
that no government held inherent sovereignty Of course, from time
to time throughout the Middle Ages, various scholars spoke of a di-
vine sanction for government, and they sometimes even took the view
that kings ruled by divine right. After citing one of these statements
of divine written by Baldus,2 2 however, two emment modern scholars
have concluded that no real significance should be attached to the
theory until the sixteenth century 2
3
In summing up this brief resume of the Middle Ages so far, care
should be taken to note that there was no regularly constituted legisla-
tive authority Any laws established by popular desire were estab-
lished by custom and usage and were incorporated into the whole
body of natural lav to be interpreted by the king. Since all law was
dependent upon acceptance by the king acting in his judicial capacity,
it must be concluded that individual citizens who by their personal
efforts might bring pressure to bear for the alteration of the legal
system were mere "advisers" of the king. Thus, as long as society was
in itself a living organism, there could be no true citizenship. But be-
fore dismissing the Middle Ages as a period in which the concept of
citizenship ceased to exist, it should be pointed out that had the con-
sent theory not been kept alive, there would have been no basis for
the rebirth of the individual and the re-emergence of the idea of citi-
zenship. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries we see the early
" IRNERIs, GLOSS ON DIGEsr, I, 3, 32.
"'COMMFNTARY ON DIGEST, 2, v. ff.
3 R. W and A. J. CARLYLE, A HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL POLITICAL THEORY IN THE
WEST, New York and London, Vol. VI, 1936, p. 272.
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stages of the revival of the concept of man as an individual and of
the laws of the land -representing the positive will of persons in the
community
If, as is now generally accepted, legislation in the Middle Ages
was the result of judicial interpretation, then we must expect to find
the first inroads of popular government in connection with the judicial
functions. If citizenship implies the right to participate in govern-
mental functions as individuals, then, of course, any such participation
in the Middle Ages would be in the administration of justice. That
this was actually the historical fact is borne out by an examination of
the Assize of Clarendon of 1166. In this document, which lays the
ground work of the modem jury system, we find reference to the term
"legal men," or men who live under the law and who are joint owners
of the law These men are the ones who are eligible for service on a
jury to investigate violations of law-the only form of "representative"
governmental function of the time. In the beginning of the document
we find:
In the first place, the aforesaid King Henry LIID, with the
consent of all his barons, for the preservation of the peace and the
keeping of justice, has enacted that inquiry shall be made through
the several counties and through the several hundreds, by twelve of
the most legal men of the hundred and by four of the most legal men
of each manor, upon their oath that they will tell the truth, whether
there is in their hundred or in their manor, any man who has been
accused or publicly suspected of humself being a robber, or murderer,
or thief, or of being a receiver of robbers, or murderers, or thieves,
since the lord king has been king.'
It is interesting to note that not only were legal men eligible for
this jury service-none but legal men were eligible-but men of bad
testimony were deprived of this right and were cast out from the law
In other words, we can safely conclude that the mai punishment for
crime was outlawry by the courts, or deprivation of the rights of
membership in the political community As the document continues
we find that-
The lord ling wills, moreover, that those who make their
law and shall be absolved by the law, if they are of very bad testi-
monv of many and legal men, shall abjure the lands of the king, so
that within eight days they shall go over the sea, unless the wind
shall have detained them; and with the first wind wich they shall
have afterward they shall go over the sea, and they shall not after-
ward return into England, except on the permission of the lord king;
and then let them be outlawed if they return, and if they return they
shall be seized as outlaws.'
-'4 TRANSLATIONS AND REPRINTS, I, 6, p. 22-23.
'Ibid., 24-25.
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With this statement of individual political privileges in a judicial
state, we have the stage set for the near-revolutionary thinking of the
thirteenth century which, as well as marking the culmination of
Middle-Age culture and development, served as a period of transition
into the modern era. Three major events of this century command
our attention at this point: Magna Carta, the development of positive
law by St. Thomas Aquinis, and the doctrine of customary law as
stated by Bracton.
In article 39 of Magna Carta, we find the earlier decree of Henry
II amplified to the extent that not only do free men, or legal men,
possess the right to sit on juries for the investigation of illegal activities,
but also that no free man may be seized, dispossessed, outlawed, ban-
ished, or in any way destroyed without a hearing before his peers.20
Again, invoking the prevailing Medieval doctrine that law was
founded in nature rather than in the will of the nation, we find fur-
ther evidence that eligibility for jury service was the only possible
method of popular participation in government. Also we find that
no freeman was responsible to a government in which he was denied
the right to participate. Clearly, English law was returning to some-
thing akin to the idea of citizenship found in early Greece and Rome.
It might be brought out in objection that in recent times women have
been denied the right to hold office and to vote while, at the same
time, they were accepted as citizens. However, this point seems to be
answered in article 54 of the same document, which reads:
No one shall be seized nor impnsoned on the appeal of
a woman concerning the death of anyone except her husband.-
This seems to imply that women did not have the full rights and
privileges enjoyed by freemen; they could not take a full part in the
dispensation of justice. If they did enjoy the position of "freemen", it
was a qualified position roughly comparable to the Roman cives sine
suffragio. However, there were instances in the Middle Ages m
which women actually did exercise judicial functions. During the
absence of Henry II in 1253, his wife Eleanor held the position of
Lady Keeper of the Privy Seal. Her duties were judicial as well as
perfuntory and ministerial and were important enough to cause Baron
Campbell to include her biographical sketch in his Lives of the Lord
Chancellors of England.'8  Also there is the case of Anne, Countess
of Pembroke, Dorset, and Montgomery, who held the office of here-
" Ibid., 1p. 6-13.
- Ibid., p. 14.
NJOIN, LORI) CAMPHI'LL, Tin LivFs OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF
IlIl (;RI ia S-Ai. OF ENGlAND FROM i-HE EARLIESr TINtrS TIm. TFiE REIGN OF GEORGE
IV 5th ed.. London, 1868, Vol. I, pp. 184-141.
KENTUCKY LAW JoumNAL
ditary sheriff. She exercised the duties of her office in person and
actually sat on the bench with judges.. Even in France, where a wo-
man could not occupy the throne, there is the case of Mahaut,
Countess of Artois, who assisted in the trial of Robert of Flanders and
in the coronation of Philip the Long. If, then, women do hold a
traditional right to be considered citizens, this right must stem from
the activities of these and others in the matriarchy of western
civilization.
St. Thomas Aquinis did not completely break away from the old
tradition of finding the law through the ceremonial incantations of
members of the legal cult that caused it to crystallize and reveal itself
to the courts; the basic law according to him was a personalized con-
cept of Aristotle's natural law which be called divine law However,
there was allowance made in his writings for amplification of this
body of law, even of additions to it so long as they did not take
precedence over the laws established by God in nature. One of the
types of law that he recognizes is positive law, or that which is the
result of man's conscious will. Of course there was no provision made
by St. Thomas for a formal legislative body, but strong recognition
was given to the fact that laws could be established by custom through
a conscious common agreement.
2 9
An even stronger statement on laws born as a result of man's will
is found in the writings of the English jurist Bracton. According to
his statement, unwritten laws and customs in England have the force
of leges, for they are established through the will of the great men as
well as of the commonwealth. Through this will, the counsel and
common consent of the nation may join with the will of the king to
constitute the authority of law 30 At first glance, this may appear little
different from the older consent theory, but the latter statement takes
into account the conscious will of individuals as opposed to the
organismic concept of society This point is given emphasis by the
later statement that positive law cannot be altered or annulled except
by the counsel and common consent of those who made it.3i
In closing this discussion of the Medieval period, we must come to
the conclusion that governmental authority continued, after the fall
of Rome, to exist by the consent of the governed. As has been pointed
out, this consent was granted collectively by a living, organic state.
This of course meant that the power of the king or emperor often was
virtually absolute; but without the theoretical existence of government
by consent, there would have been no basis for the later emergence
29SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 2, 2, 57, 2.
SDE Lz~mus, I, 1, 2.
"Ibid., 2, 6,
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or rebirth of the individual's privilege of participating m government.
Cicero's statement, cited earlier, that true freedom could not exist
without this right of participation in government, seems to be given
recognition in the fact that the first step taken toward our modern
English liberties was the grant to freemen of the right to participate
in the judicial activity, the only active governmental function of the
time. This of course is a far cry from universal suffrage, but this early
beginning did mark a step forward in re-establishing the long for-
gotten principle that eligibility for governmental participation was
the distinguishing mark of citizenship-in this case, the mark of a
freeman.
The road from this early beginning to the general recognition of
parliamentary supremacy in 1688 was a long and tedious one that
must be dealt with in a very brief and sweeping glance at this point.
The chief characteristic of the development was the change from the
concept of Parliament as a court to the acceptance of that body as a
formal representative legislative group. Not until very recent times
has either England or America enjoyed anything approaching univer-
sal suffrage, but the theory of representation in a legislative body on
a strictly individualistic basis was firmly established in theory by the
time of William and Mary Even with this trend in England, we do
find the more doctrinaire writings on the continent defining citizenship
as a condition growing out of judicial privileges and immunities, a
close approach to the insecure possession of the civitas sine suffragio
of Roman times. As an illustration of this, we have the following
quotation from Jean Bodin, which gives its author a strong clain to
the title of "patron saint of the post-Fourteenth-Amendment Supreme
Court"
It is a more serious fault to say that none is a citizen who
does not participate m public authority, or who has no part m the
deliberative or consultive bodies. This is Anstotle's definition.
It has been more truly said by Plutarch that citizens are those who
enjoy the benefits of the laws and privileges of a civil community,
varying according to age, sex, rank, and condition, so that, for
example, nobles have the rights of nobles, and plebians the rights
of plebiansO'
Nevertheless, the cry in England was against taxation without
representation, and the idea was carried over to the Nev World
that the right of governments to regulate the activities of men was
based on the consent of man. Without this concept, neither the Revo-
lution of 1688 nor the American Revolution would have been likely
Without these two movements, the whole body of Anglo-American
DF RFPUBLICA LIBRI SEX <Frankfurt ed.), pp. 80181, (Trans, F. W Coker).
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liberties very likely would have fallen victim to the high infant mor-
tality rate. It is with this thought, then, that we turn to a discussion
of American developments and the idea that freedom consists largely
of a voice in the management of the affairs of state.
IV
Who would be free, themselves must strike the blow.
-Byron
Freedom exists only where the people take care of the
government.
-Woodrow Wilson
Every school boy has had impressed upon him the idea that the
thirteen colonies of Great Britain in the New World sought independ-
ence from the mother country because of their objection to taxation
without representation. More mature scholars are apt to look upon
this as an over simplification, yet we find that it is the basis for the
clinching argument for separation from Britain used in the Declara-
tion of Independence:
to secure these rights, governments are created
among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the gov-
erned; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive
of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and
to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such prn-
ciples, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their safety and happiness.
When Jefferson wrote these words, he was not merely restating
the old consent theory of the Middle Ages, although a quick glance
at what has been said on the preceding pages may indicate it. The
difference lies in the fact that Jefferson had been exposed to the writ-
ings of a host of continental and English writers who had expanded
the contract theory from the thirteenth century until the period fol-
lowing the Revolution of 1688. No longer, by his day, was the idea
of consent by an organismic society universally accepted. The back-
ground of Jefferson's ideas is so vaned, of course, that it is impossible
to devote the space here to an adequate discussion of it; however, a
few short quotations from some of the leading writers of the seven-
teenth century will serve to illustrate the changed concept of com-
munity during the period mentioned.
Early in the seventeenth century Grotius, in speaking of law
growing out of social obligations, had said:
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For those who had associated themselves with some group,
or had subjected themselves to a man or to men, had either ex-
pressly promised, or from the nature of the transaction must be
understood impliedly to have promised, that they would conform to
that which should have been determined, in the one case by the
majority, in the other by those upon whom authority had been
conferred.-
This was soon followed by Samuel Pufendorf's observation on
the organism known as society, which reads:
On the whole, to join a multitude, or many men, into
one Compound Person, to which one general act may be ascribed,
and to which certain rights belong, as "tis opposed to particular mem-
bers, and such rights as no particular member can claim separately
from the rest; 'tis necessary, that they shall have first united their
wills and powers by the intervention of covenants; without which,
how a number of men, who are all naturally equal, should be link'd to-
gether, is impossible to be understood.'
Even though the name of Thomas Hobbes has not gone down
in history as an exponent of popular limitations upon established au-
thority, we do find a curious reference to a social contract-though
this contract is used to justify a government founded on force. The
statement is that-
I authorize and give up my right of governing myself,
to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou
give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like
manner. -
Although Harrington's doctrine of rotation in office may leave
much to be desired from the point of view of modern democracy, the
place of the individual was well established in his system. He de-
scribes his equal commonwealth as-
a government established upon an equal Agrarian,
arising into the superstructure on three orders, the senate debating
and proposing, the people resolving, and the magistracy executing
by an equal rotation through the suffrage of the people given by
the ballot."
A thinker held in particularly high esteem by Jefferson was Al-
gernon Sydney In attempting to justify popular control, Sydney asks-
whether bawds, whores, thieves, buffoons, parasites,
and such vile wretches as are naturally mercenary, have not more
power of Whitehall, Versailles, the Vatican, and the Escurnal, than
in Venice, Amsterdam, and Switzerland: whether Hide, Arlington,
Danby, their graces of Cleveland and Portsmouth, Sunderland, Jen-
kins, or Chiffinch, could probably have attained such power as they
PROLT COMFNA (Kelsev's trans.), sect. 15.
Dr JIR- N %TURA-; Ef GN I IUM (Kennet's trans.). Bk. VII, Ch. II, sec. 6.
Lr'1iATAN, Ch. XVII.
"O0 ANA (Liljegren ed.), p. 33.
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have had amongst us if it had been disposed of by the suffrages of
parliament and people.!
We may conclude this resume of Jefferson's intellectual back-
ground with an appropriate quotation from John Locke, who repre-
sents the culmination of pre-American democratic theory In speak-
ing of the community, he says:
That which acts any community, being only the consent
of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one
body to move one way; it is necessary the body should move that way
whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the
majority.
The general trend of the above quotations demonstrates clearly
that the social contract was no longer, as in the Middle Ages, based on
the consent of a mystical corporate body with its own life but upon
the agreement of individual members of that society This clearly
shows where Jefferson and his predecessors broke from their fore-
bears. Of course it would be assuming too much to say that by
Jefferson's time the suffrage was considered to be a fundamental
right of citizenship, but it certainly is obvious that the theory of
popular participation was developing and that the theoretical basis
of the suffrage was being broadened. If this had not been the case,
there would have been the anomaly of some privileged persons de-
terminmg the will of the group, nothing short of a return to
medievalism!
Some of the early state constitutions in this country give recogni-
tion to the suffrage as a natural right of citizens, which is a quite
natural view for men of the Revolutionary period and early nineteenth
century to adopt. The first constitution of Virginia makes some broad
statements as to the natural rights of man, and recognizes that among
these rights is a share in the control of the officers of government.
More specifically, Article 6 of the Declaration of Rights deals with
elections, statmg that they should be free and that-
All men having sufficient evidence of permanent common
interest with, and common attachment to the community, have the
right of suffrage.'
The word "citizen" is not used here, but is clearly implied by the
phrases "permanent common interest" and "common attachment," for
what is a citizen but a member of a political society? The same sec-
tion from which the above quotation is taken lists among the rights
of these "electors" immunity against taxation or the power of eminent
'rDiscouRsFs (Toland ed.), p. 205.
OF CIVIL GOVERNIMENT, Bt. II, sect. 96.
HENENG, STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, p. 109.
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domain without their own consent or that of their representatives.
Presumably those who did not qualify as having a permanent com-
mon interest in or attachment to the community did not enjoy this
immunity but must be considered as possessing limited or sine
suffragio citizenshtp.
Other states were not as free in recognizing the suffrage as a
natural right; in fact, the frontier state of Vermont was the first to
give more than formal recognition and grant umversal male suffrage.
However, the trend throughout the country was toward a general
liberalization of voting requirements, which in itself is indicative of
the influence of the "right of suffrage" school of thought. One of
the strongest arguments for the natural right to the suffrage in the
post-Revolutionary period comes from the pen of Joel Barlow, who
proclaims the necessity for a national legislature with population
alone as the basis for representation and chosen by universal man-
hood suffrage. Recognizing a kind of natural aristocracy, based on
individual merits rather than heredity, however, he says:
That some men in the same society should be wiser and
better than others, is.very natural; and it is natural, that the people
should choose them to represent them in the formulation of laws."
The effect of such quotations is noticeable in the constitutional
debates of the first part of the nineteenth cenury The New York
convention of 1821 provided an arena of debate over the question of
the suffrage as a right of all men, though the discussion involved the
content of the constitution rather than natural law 41 Later several
delegates, notably Jay and Clarke, advanced the idea of natural law
as a basis for universal suffrage.42 The natural right approach is more
noticeable in the Massachusetts convention of 1820-21, but with the
same result of presenting the suffrage as a right. Leaders of this
viewpoint were Richardson, Baldwin, Dearborn, and Dana, the latter
going so far as to say that property qualifications were anti-republican
and were imposed before independence was assured and before the
principles of government were understood.4 3 Writers on political
questions in the following years took up the cry for the right of
universal suffrage, as exemplified by E. P Hurlbut. His theory of the
suffrage stems from his contention that government is established for
the purpose of protecting human rights. For this reason, every citizen
who has an undekstanding of his right should have the suffrage re-
"POLITICAL WVRITINGS, 1796 ed., p. 168.
"NFw YORK DEBATES, 1821. 163-178.
'2 Ibid., 183-186.
421NIAcs\ciSETsrrs DrBArES, 1820-21. 124-196, passim.
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gardless of property He even toys with the idea of experimenting
with woman suffrage.
44
Thus, we see m the early part of our history as an independent
nation not universal acceptance of, but, at least, a growing feeling that
universal suffrage was based on a right of man and was closely linked
to liberty itself. The trend was in this direction until the Civil War.
In the immediately preceding discussion, the word citizen was used to
a minimum degree, since there was no universal understanding of its
meaning before the Fourteenth Amendment; but since that Amend-
ment did attempt to establish a basis for it, it will be used more freely
in the following pages. Before taking up the aftermath of its passage,
however, it would be appropriate to examine a few of the leading
court decisions of the pre-Civil War period.
In the early cases coming under federal jurisdiction, there were
attempts made by the courts to define the word citizen. One example is
the case of Johnson v Twenty-one Bales, in which a Federal Judge rec-
ognized that there were no citizens under the law of nations, but that
that law recognized all men as members of the societies in which they
were found.45 This was followed by another court which said that
as far as jurisdiction of the courts is concerned, citizenship means
nothing more than residence. 46 The clear implication here is that
all persons had certain judicial rights even though they were not full
members of the community in the fullest sense. Those unqualified
citizens were a part of that body known as "we the people" who held
the sovereignty This point is brought home in an early Kentucky
decision regarding a slave suing for her freedom. Here we find a
citizen defined as one who enjoys all the privileges enjoyed by the
highest class in society This includes the right to participate in the
choosing of officers and of seeking public office. The plaintiff in this
case did not possess this right for two reasons: first, because of her
sex, and second, because of her membership in a servile class. There-
fore, it was concluded that her rights before the courts were not
guaranteed, and she could not bring suit for her freedom. The case
was dismissed.
47
The latter case has one interesting implication; judicial rights
are not secure without political rights. Women, as the court stated,
were dependent upon adult males, as were children, so their rights
were protected by the condifion of those adult males. A slave, how-
14 ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR POLITICAL GUARANTEES, New York, 1845,
p. 107, 118-128 144-172.4
7 Fed. Cas. No. 7, 417 2 Payne 601 (181-t).
16n re The Pizarro, 2 Wheat. 227 4 L. Ed. 226 (1817).
,-Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. 326 (18,22).
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ever, had no rights. This doctrine was adhered to until the Civil War
and was stated by the Supreme Court in the celebrated case of Dred
Scott v Sanford.4- This should prove the logic of Cicero's statement
that liberty could not exist without political rights and seems to verify
the contention that the early view in this country that judicial rights
and immunities belonged to those who held the political power.
It is not, of course, to be assumed that the suffrage has ever been
considered in practice to be a right of American citizenship, but the
evidence seems to leave little doubt that in the early years full rights
before the law belonged only to those who exercised the sovereignty
It was not until after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment that
we have the problem of Negro citizenship, but with that problem fac-
ing them the courts were well able to defend the special political
privileges of the white population and find a basis in American law
for cwitas sine suffragia.
V
Schuler- Zur Rechtsgelehrsankeit kannich nuch nicht bequemen.
Mephistopholes: Ich kannes Euch so sehr nzcht ubelnehen,
Ich weisz, wie es un diese Lehre steht.
Es erben sich Gesetz' und Rechte
Wie eine ewge Krankheit fort,
Sic schleppen von Geschlecht sich zun Geschlechte
Und rucken sach von Ort zu Ort.
Vernunft wtird Unsinn, Wohltat Plage;
Weh dir, dasz du em Enkel Bist!
Vomn Rechte, das mit geboren ist,
Von demn ist leider! ne die Frage.
-Goethe's Faust
Latw, logic and Switzers may be hired to fight for anybody.
-English proverb
The Fourteenth Amendment attempted to establish a formal con-
cept of national citizenship and went so far as to define some of the
privileges that that condition carried with it. Among these privileges
were immunities against arbitrary action on the part of the state, par-
ticularly judicial action. It also- provided that Congress should have
the power to decrease the representation of any state m the National
House of Representatives by the same proportion that adult male
citizens were denied the suffrage by that state. This, of course, does
11 19 How. 393, 15 L. Ed. 691 (1856).
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not establish enfranchisement of citizens as a right but does recognize
the principle that the will of a political society can be determined only
by its members. Representatives can represent only those who voted;
otherwise a minority would determine the will of an organic state.
This provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, then, was merely a
restatement of the doctrine of a society made up of individuals rather
than having a life of its own.
Following the ratification of this Amendment, a case came before
the Georgia courts testing the status of citizens in relation to the
suffrage. This involved the election of 1868, in which Richard W
White, a "person of color," defeated William J. Clements in the race
for clerk of the superior court of Chatham County Clements brought
suit for possession of the office on the ground that White was not
eligible, as a "person of color," to hold office. The superior court of
the Eastern Circuit upheld Clements' claimto the office, but White
appealed to the Supreme Court of the State, presided over by Chief
Justice Joseph E. Brown, Governor of Georgia during the Confederate
period. That court, in an opinion by the Chief Justice and a con-
curring opinion by Justice McCay, held that White was a citizen and,
as such had a right to vote and hold office. Of the word citizen,
Brown's statement was that-
The word is never used by the people in a monarchy,
since it involves an idea not enjoyed by subjects, to wit, the inherent
nght to partake in the government."
In the light of precedents it is difficult to see how the Georgia
Supreme Court could have held otherwise. The very fact that the
Fourteenth Amendment authorized Congress to take punitive steps
against states who denied a substantial number of citizens the suffrage,
indicates that the denial was one of right rather than privilege. Tlus
of course raises the question that if the Fourteenth Amendment did
give recognition to the suffrage as a right of citizenship, what was the
necessity for the Fifteenth and still later the Nineteenth? The only
answer to this is that neither of the latter amendments attempted to
establish the suffrage as a right of citizenship, but merely prohibited
specific discriminations -with regard to the elective franchise. Tacit
recognition of the right to vote, at least for male citizens, had already
been given in the former. There is, as has been previously stated,
sufficient ground for believing that the right of suffrage had been con-
sidered a natural right of free citizens, as is indicated in a New York
decision shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment to the effect that
It, White v. Clements, 39 Ga. 232 (1869).
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the Constitution did not confer the right of suffrage but simply recog-
nizes it as an existing right.
50
The United States Supreme Court has never at any time given
full recognition to the inalienable right of a citizen to vote. However,
from time to time m its history, it has spoken of citizens as "the peo-
ple," presumably that group which holds the sovereignty This
point is illustrated in the Cruikshank case, which as well as pointing
out that there was no fundamental right to vote inherent in citizenship,
spoke of citizens as the members of the political community to which
the), belong. They are the people, said the Court, who compose the
community, and who m their associated capacity have established or
submitted to the dominion of a government for the promotion of their
welfare and protection of their individual, as well as their collective,
rights."' If, in the face of this, our courts are to continue to insist that
the only protection of the suffrage on the part of the Federal govern-
ment is against specific discriminations in voting, and not recognition
of the franchise as a right, we may, as well as not, reverse our recent
trend of broadening the basis of suffrage. This is the historic view,
however,-, and has not been altered materially in recent election
cases.A5 The negative, non-discrimiation view is usually accepted
by our leading constitutional lawyers. As has been noted, however,
this was not the approach before the Fifteenth Amendment; so we
must conclude that it is the result of legal mampulations designed to
thwart the threat of engulfment by the non-white population. People
are rash, and their will as expressed by their elected representatives
must be tempered by the sound judgment of the "corporate mind" as
"found" and not "made", by the courts.
The development of the present view on citizenship and the
suffrage cannot be documented in the limited space allowed here,
but it should be pointed out that tins view rests primarily on two
major decisions of the Supreme Court in addition to those cited above.
These are Minor v Happersett and Gumn v United States,54 the
former dealing with woman suffrage and the latter with Negro
suffrage under the Fifteenth Amendment. Both of these state that
voting is not a right, but a privilege, the terms of which are to be
- People v. Wilson, 3 Hun. (N. Y.) 437 (1875).
51 United States V. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1875).
•-United States v. Givens, Fed. Cas. No. 15,211 (1873); McKay v. Campbell, Fed.
Cas. No. 8,839, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 120, 1 Sawy. 374 (1870); United States v. Crosby, Fed.
Cas. No. 14,893, 1 Hughes 448 (1871); United States v. knthony, Fed. Case. No. 14,459,
11 Blatch. 200 (1873); United States v. Amsden, 6 Fed. 819 (1881); and other Fif-
teenth Amendment cases.
= Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 88 L. Ed. 987, 64 S. Ct. 757 (1944).
21 Wall. 162 (1875); 238 U. S. 374, 35 S. Ct. 926, 59 L. Ed. 1340 (1915).
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determined by law The only protection of the suffrage found in the
National Constitution is protection against specific discriminations,
and not of the right to vote per se. This view has never been aban-
doned by the national judiciary and has been restated in the latest
pronouncements on the subject. At the turn of the twentieth century,
however, there was a slight, though not serious, threat to this argu-
ment, when the Supreme Court upheld a Court of Claims statement
to the effect that since a party was not a citizen of Texas at the time
of the state's declaration of independence, he could not be considered
"one of the people of Texas." z' This, of course, implies that a citizen
is by definihon one of the body of "people," the sovereign body of the
state. One who is not one of the people, then, is one who does not
share in the sovereignty
This writer realizes fully that this brief discussion of the American
courts cannot qualify as a definitive study and does no more than point
out a few cases illustrating major trends; necessity for condensation
has made this inevitable. The present doctrine, however, is well
enough understood to make a definitive study unnecessary as long as
it is pointed out that the suffrage is not a right under our contemporary
interpretations. Also, it is believed that the few cases mentioned are
sufficient, in view of the earlier portion of this article, to point out the
fact that modern legal thought represents a reversal of a trend of
thought that has developed in an almost unbroken chain of political
writings since the time of Aristotle.
In conclusion, it should be re-emphasized that government in
the Western World has always been considered to be the result of a
contract or an act of consent. In the writings of Greece and the
Roman Republic, this consent was given by individuals. In the
period of the Roman Empire and during the Middle Ages, society was
looked upon as an organic body with a will separate from that of its
members. During these periods, man not only lost his political
privileges, but also Ins personal freedoms and immunities that were
dependent upon them. These liberties and immunities of man were
reborn only after man began the long journey back to gaining a share
in the honors of the state, a journey not yet completed. Since the
Civil War, we have been faced with the spectre of Negro voting; and
in attempting to solve the problem presented by it, have developed a
bit of legal rationalism that represents a reversal of our trend since the
dawn of the modern era. True, the suffrage has been broadened dur-
ing this period, but by doing the right thing in the wrong way we
Coutzen v. United States, 33 Ct. C1. 475 (1898): affirmed 141 U. S. 191, 21 S. Ct.
98, 45 L. Ed. 148 (1900).
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have left open the door to legal restrictions on voting that well may
rob us of our birthright as a free nation. Any attempt to say that the
will of "we the sovereign people" can be determined by those citizens
who can pay poll tax, qualify as persons without color or African
ancestry, or boast a fanily tree, instead of by all the people is no more
than a return to the Medieval doctrine of an organismic society When
a large number of people accept that view, we have started down
the road backwards.
Of course, it must be recogmzel that certain qualifications, such
as age, residence, sanity, et cetera, must be held by voters. These,
however, are not real restrictions on popular rule, whereas any hint
of an organismic society is. It must be concluded by this writer, after
an admittedly exploratory rather than definitive study, that there is
strong evidence pointing to the fact that without the suffrage there
can be no citizenship. The recommendations of the President's
Commission on Civil Rights, cited earlier, has considerable justifica-
lion for including the suffrage as a right. In fact, it seems that Federal
protection of the right to vote, rather than guarantees against
discrinimations, was the eventual goal of the theorists from whose
doctrines our Constitution developed. Rather than being nullius filius,
it may be argued that the doctrine of right to vote may be the victim
of an imposter or pretender which has has crowded it from its rightful
place in our legal thought.

